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Article
The Peril of Imposing the Rule of Law: Lessons
From Liberia
By Jonathan Compton†
INTRODUCTION
Deep in the jungle of Liberia, tribal elders have gathered to
settle disputes. First is a man who accuses his neighbor of
stealing his goat. The neighbor insists that he did not steal the
animal and that it must have wandered off. The elders force the
alleged thief to drink poison. If he is telling the truth he will
live; if he is lying he will die.
Next is a woman who alleges that she was raped by
another villager. Under the supervision of the elders, the
parents of both parties discuss the situation. They determine
that the alleged rapist’s family should pay the victim’s family
forty-eight dollars. The families share a common meal and
agree to put the matter behind them. The alleged rapist and
victim continue to farm next to each other.
Miles away in the capital city Monrovia, a reform-minded
government is considering how to strengthen the rule of law.
While the nation has a Western justice system, it was
devastated by a recent civil war and remains weak in rural
areas where locals prefer traditional practices. The government
and its international partners are eager to fix this problem.
They pour money into the formal justice system, outlaw
†
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traditional practices, and focus on promoting human rights.
The rule of law is strengthened. Or is it?
The United States and the United Nations are regularly
involved in post-conflict reconstruction and rule of law
1
missions. Often, this encompasses strengthening or even
2
creating the justice system. Those involved in reconstruction
generally assume the inherent superiority of Western systems
or international standards, and favor these over traditional
3
practices. While these systems and standards may be superior
to certain customary practices, the imposition of a Westernstyle system will not always strengthen the rule of law. In fact,
imposition may actually undermine the rule of law. Liberia
provides an example.
The modern Republic of Liberia began with grand
intentions — free African Americans immigrating to Africa to

1. See SHAWNA WILSON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., U.S. RULE OF LAW
ASSISTANCE:
A
GUIDE
FOR
JUDGES
(2011),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/RulLaw11.pdf/$file/RulLaw11.pdf
(reviewing the U.S. government agencies supporting rule of law reform);
United
Nations
and
the
Rule
of
Law,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (explaining how
over forty UN entities are engaged in rule of law work in over 110 countries,
many of which are in “conflict and post-conflict situations”).
2. See, e.g., Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan Fact Sheet, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE (May 4, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/189320.htm
(discussing U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan “develop a formal justice sector”
and to “train and build capacity” for the Afghan system).
3. While the UN acknowledges the role of informal justice mechanisms,
its approach is to further “the implementation of international norms and
standards.” Informal Justice, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW,
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=30 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
Additionally, the U.S. definition of “rule of law” assumes a separation of
powers and adherence to international human rights law. See U.S. AGENCY
FOR INT’L DEV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECURITY SECTOR
REFORM 4 (2009) (available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization
/115810.pdf) (“Rule of [l]aw is a principle under which all persons, institutions,
and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights law.”)
(footnote omitted). The UN definition is the same. See U.N. Secretary-General,
The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23,
2004) (“[The rule of law] refers to a principle of governance in which all
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State
itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced
and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards.”).
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4

create their own community. The settlers brought with them a
Western adversarial justice system and patterned their
5
constitution and laws after those found in the United States.
This type of justice system, however, was foreign to the
indigenous population who had well-established customary
6
justice practices. A dual justice system emerged as the
indigenous population continued to use traditional practices
7
despite disapproval by the national government. The different
views of how the justice system should work contributed to the
growing tensions between the groups. The heightened tensions
between the groups ultimately led to a horrific civil war from
8
1989 to 2003.
After the war, Liberia’s new government began to rebuild
9
with the assistance of the international community. Concerned
that customary justice practices violated international
standards, the government and its partners attempted to
10
strengthen Liberia’s formal justice system. The majority of
4. See JOHN-PETER PHAM, LIBERIA: PORTRAIT OF A FAILED STATE, 5–11
(2004).
5. See Jim Dube, Resurrecting the Rule of Law in Liberia, 60 ME. L. REV.
575, 576–77 (2008) (explaining how Liberia’s legal system, first constitution,
and laws were all patterned after those found in the United States).
6. See EZEKIEL PAJIBO, INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL
ASSISTANCE, TRADITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS: THE LIBERIAN CASE 16–22
(2008) (describing customary justice methods in “pre-settler Liberia”); Dube,
supra note 5, at 577. Cf. Pewee Flomoku & Lemuel Reeves, Formal and
Informal Justice in Liberia, ACCORD, Mar. 2012, at 44, 45, available at
http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/CON1222_Accord_23_9.pdf
(explaining
how “evidence-based due process is largely alien” to rural Liberians today).
7. See e.g., Amanda C. Rawls, Policy Proposals for Justice Reform in
Liberia: Opportunities Under the Current Legal Framework to Expand Access
to Justice, in CUSTOMARY JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT
91, 104 (Janine Ubink & Thomas McInerney eds., 2011), available at
http://www.idlo.org/Publications/CustomaryJustice3.pdf (explaining how the
Liberian Supreme Court declared all forms of trial by ordeal, one such
traditional practice, to be unconstitutional in 1940, yet “[i]rrespective of the
law, many forms of trial by ordeal continue to be practiced throughout the
country.”). For a further discussion of trial by ordeal, see the section titled
“The Customary Justice System” below. For a further discussion of the
emergence of the dual justice system, see the section titled “Historical
Background” below.
8. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 8–11 (discussing the rift between the settlers
and the indigenous people, how that rift led to a coup, and the years of
subsequent violence).
9. See UNMIL Background, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en
/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2013)
(explaining the background of the United Nations Mission in Liberia).
10. See Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44 (describing the work and
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Liberians, however, did not use the formal system and
11
continued to prefer customary practices.
Recently, the
Liberian government has moved away from their policy of
imposition and began to discuss justice reform with traditional
12
leaders. While not approving of all traditional practices, the
government is listening to the reasons and values behind
onerous customs rather than focusing merely on their
13
elimination. This dialogue is ongoing and has great potential
to strengthen the rule of law without compromising human
14
rights standards.
This article contends that the imposition of a Western
justice system has been a source of conflict in Liberia and has
15
not strengthened the rule of law. In fact, imposition has been
the enemy of the rule of law. However, recent efforts to consider
the reasons and values behind the customary system, rather
than merely focusing on regulating or eliminating it, have
eased tensions and shown great potential for strengthening the
rule of law in Liberia. This provides important lessons for
future rule of law missions in other nations.
This article uses the definition of “the rule of law” adopted
by both the United States and the United Nations: “Rule of
[l]aw is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and
entities, public and private, including the state itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally
international support directed at strengthening the formal system); Rawls,
supra note 7, at 96 (explaining how the emphasis on the formal system stems
from the priorities of, and financing from, the United Nations, United States,
and other international partners who have a specific justice paradigm and
“routinely express concern over the protection of human rights”).
11. See DEBORAH H. ISSER ET AL., LOOKING FOR JUSTICE: LIBERIAN
EXPERIENCES WITH AND PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL JUSTICE OPTIONS, 3–4 (2009).
12. See Tim Luccaro, Navigating Liberia’s Justice Landscape, U.S.
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.usip.org/in-thefield/navigating-liberias-justice-landscape (discussing the work of the Liberian
Legal Working Group and its discussions with the Traditional Leadership
Council).
13. See Findings of the Legal Working Group as Adopted on December 10,
2009, at III.A.3, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.usip.org/inthe-field/navigating-liberias-justice-landscape (follow “document” hyperlink).
14. The details of the government’s new approach, the ongoing dialogue,
and the potential it creates are discussed in detail in Part III below.
15. This article uses the U.S./UN definition of rule of law, which
encompasses the following principles:
universal accountability, public
promulgation, equal enforcement, independent adjudication, and consistency
with international human rights law. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra
note 3; The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 3, at ¶ 6.
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enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are
16
consistent with international human rights law.” Relevant
international human rights laws include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights Articles 7 through 11 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article
17
14.
This article begins with a brief historical background in
Part I. Part II explains the components of Liberia’s formal and
customary justice systems, their strengths and weaknesses,
and which system Liberians prefer. Part III examines how
Liberia has approached rule of law reform after the civil war
and its recent shift in perspective. Part IV explains how the
imposition of the formal system has not strengthened the rule
of law in Liberia and how Liberia’s new approach shows great
promise for strengthening the rule of law and reaching
international standards. Finally, Part V draws some lessons
from Liberia that can be applied to future rule of law missions.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Modern Liberia began in 1821 when the American
Colonization Society (ACS) purchased land on Africa’s Atlantic
18
coast for a settlement of free African Americans. The ACS
19
financed the settlement and the transportation of the settlers.
By 1843, the group had sent 4,571 African American settlers to
20
Liberia. Three years later, the ACS called on the settlers to
16. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 3. See U.N. SecretaryGeneral, supra note 3, at ¶ 6.
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
18. See PHAM, supra note 4, at 5–11. The ACS was a group of American
religious, government, and business leaders, including Supreme Court Justice
Bushrod Washington, Speaker of the House Henry Clay, Congressman Daniel
Webster, and future president Andrew Jackson. The member’s motives for
forming Liberia ranged from encouraging emancipation to keeping freed
slaves from inciting a slave revolt. Id. at 7.
19. Id. at 5–11.
20. Id. at 12. However, more than half of these died, resettled elsewhere,
or returned to the United States. See id. at 12–13. African Americans were
soon eclipsed by other groups. From 1827 to 1847, the majority of people
arriving in Liberia were “recaptured” Africans, who had been taken as slaves
but never made it to another continent. See id. at 52–53. After the slave trade
was abolished in the United Kingdom and the United States, these nations
would routinely intercept slave ships and return them to Africa. Id. Large
numbers of these recaptured Africans were dropped off in Liberia, regardless
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21

govern and defend themselves. The settlers declared their
independence on July 26, 1847 and subsequently ratified a
22
constitution.
The 1847 Constitution was heavily influenced by the U.S.
23
Constitution and clearly favored the settlers or “Americo24
Liberians.” Only “Negroes” could be citizens, only citizens
25
could own property, and only property owners could vote.
26
Despite constituting a majority of the population, indigenous
people were classified as “Aborigines,” rather than “Negroes,”
27
and were ineligible for citizenship. Most Liberians were
“excluded from participation in their government and in their
28
court system.”
of their country of origin. See id. at 53. Liberians referred to these people as
“Congos.” Id. Many “Congos” were able to assimilate into the American
Liberian culture and most were granted citizenship in the later Republic of
Liberia. Id. at 54. The distinction between the two groups has lessened with
time. Id.
21. See id. at 17. This was prompted by the difficulties Liberia had
defending its interests. Other nations had viewed Liberia as a privately owned
settlement with no claim to sovereignty. Therefore, they refused to submit to
Liberian customs and taxes. The United States did not consider Liberia a
colony and declined to intervene in its disputes. See id. at 14–17.
22. Id. at 17–20. There were several “constitutions” prior to 1847;
however, these were often organizational frameworks promulgated by the
ACS. See id. at 14–16. Even the Constitution of 1839, an improvement over its
predecessors with regard to democratic participation, gave the ACS authority
to appoint the president. Id. at 16.
23. See id. at 19. A Harvard law professor wrote the draft Constitution
that the ACS forwarded to the convention. It established three branches of
government patterned after those found in the United States.
24. Id. at 20.
25. Id. “Negros” included Americo-Liberians and Congos. See id. at 54.
26. Dube, supra note 5, at 577 (explaining that indigenous groups
accounted for more than ninety percent of the population).
27. PHAM, supra note 4, at 20. Indigenous Liberians did not receive the
right to vote until 1946.
Abdul Rahman Lamin, Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation: Analysis of the Prospects and Challenges of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in Liberia, in A TORTUOUS ROAD TO PEACE: THE
DYNAMICS OF REGIONAL, UN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA, 229, 232 (Festus Abogye & Alhaji M S Bah eds.,
2005), available at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/TORTUOUSCHAP10.
PDF. Even then, indigenous Liberians did not necessarily have full property
rights. The 1956 Code of Laws made clear that indigenous tribes’ land was
public land used with the permission of the central government. The land
could convert to private ownership only when the tribe became “sufficiently
advanced in civilization”. PHAM, supra note 4, at 63.
28. Dube, supra note 5, at 577. The Monrovia ruling class generally
ignored the indigenous population until European colonial powers threatened
Liberia’s territory. The government then began to think about how to
effectively occupy the indigenous areas. See PHAM, supra note 4, at 59.
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From 1847 to 1980, the Americo-Liberians tightly
29
controlled the government and monopolized political power.
Their political party, the True Whig Party, maintained its
30
control through a powerful system of political patronage.
During this time, the government provided little access to
31
formal justice for most of the population. In the early
twentieth century, Liberia began to recognize the authority of
tribal chiefs; however, that recognition was often dependent on
32
the chiefs implementing the policy of Monrovia. In 1905,
Liberia established the Hinterland Regulations — statutory
33
law created to govern the “uncivilized” indigenous population.
The Hinterland Regulations gave traditional chiefs limited
authority to interpret and enforce the regulations as local
34
laws. This essentially created two justice systems: one for
35
Americo-Liberians, and the other for indigenous Liberians.
Monrovia not only established the regulations, it controlled
their enforcement. Corporal punishments ordered by tribal
courts would not be enforced unless approved by government
officials, and fines imposed by tribal courts would go to the
Board of Revenues for all cases except those involving a breach
36
of local custom. The government also began to regulate
customary practices, requiring some practitioners of traditional
37
justice to be licensed. Eventually, Monrovia transitioned from
29. Dube, supra note 5, at 577; see also Jamie O’Connell, Here Interest
Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support Reconstruction in Liberia,
and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARD. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 210
(2004).
30. Lamin, supra note 27, at 231.
31. See Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16.
32. PHAM, supra note 4, at 59–60. Monrovia is the capitol of Liberia and is
used synonymously with the ruling class. Monrovia had been the center of
power from the beginning of Liberia. Outlying settlements complained that
the 1847 Constitution concentrated power in Monrovia and made no provision
for local government. Id. at 19.
33. Rawls, supra note 7, at 106.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Gerald H. Zarr, Liberia, in AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS 191, 197 (Alan
Milner ed., 1969).
37. See id. at 196. Trial by ordeal of a “minor nature” that did not
endanger life was allowed for a period of time; however, the Department of the
Interior regulated the process. An “ordeal doctor” would have to pass tests
given by the Department of Interior to confirm his “competence and skill.”
After passing the tests, he would be given a certificate allowing him to
practice. Eventually, “minor” trial by ordeal was illegal. See also Rawls, supra
note 7, at 103 (discussing how, in 1940, the Supreme Court declared all forms
of trial by ordeal unconstitutional). For a further discussion of trial by ordeal,
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regulating tribal justice to supplanting it. By 1963, Liberia had
abolished the concurrent criminal jurisdiction of the tribal
38
courts, seeking to avoid a dual justice system.
Despite Monrovia’s attempt to regulate and then eliminate
them, tribal justice systems continued. Indigenous Liberians
sought justice from customary leaders and continued with
traditional justice practices that predated the arrival of the
39
Americo-Liberians. The Liberian government undermined
traditional justice practices by intervening in the selection of
traditional leaders, removing communities from their
40
traditional lands, and maintaining the formal justice system.
All of this contributed to the growing unrest.
The tension between the Americo and indigenous Liberians
ultimately led to a violent uprising in the late twentieth
41
century that sparked years of violence and civil war. On April
12, 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe came to power in a
42
military coup. Doe, a member of the Krahn ethnic group,
43
became the first indigenous leader of Liberia. However,
instead of ending the system of patronage, Doe continued it,
44
with Krahns replacing the Americo-Liberians. Doe not only
promoted Krahns to important government positions, he also

see the section titled “The Customary Justice System” below.
38. Zarr, supra note 36, at 196. In 1969, Liberian Law Professor Gerald H.
Zarr predicted that the chiefs would “continue to exercise jurisdiction in minor
criminal cases for a few years until the legislation [ending the concurrent
jurisdiction] [could] be strictly enforced.” Id. However, tribal court jurisdiction
did not easily go away. The law that repealed the Hinterland Regulations was
itself repealed in 1973. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has republished the
Hinterland Regulations since then, as late as 2001. However, the regulations
violate multiple provisions of the Liberian constitution, and multiple Supreme
Court decisions and acts of the legislature have declared most of the
Regulations illegal or obsolete. It remains unclear whether the Regulations
are the law. Rawls, supra note 7, at 106–107.
39. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16 (describing the justice mechanisms in “presettler Liberia” and explaining how Liberians continued to use them). Pajibo
goes on to describe the role of customary leaders in these processes. Id. at 16–
22. For a further discussion of traditional justice mechanisms, see the section
titled “The Customary Justice System” below.
40. Id. at 16. The components of the “dual justice system” Pajibo refers to
are the formal and customary systems. Id. at 23. The components are
discussed in detail in the section titled “Overview of the Dual Justice System”
below.
41. Id. at 8–11.
42. Dube, supra note 5, at 577.
43. Lamin, supra note 27, at 233.
44. See id.
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brutalized civilians from other indigenous ethnic groups. His
actions ultimately precipitated civil war.
In 1989, rebel forces led by Charles Taylor invaded Liberia
46
from Cote d’Ivoire. The rebels, primarily composed of ethnic
47
Grios and Manos who had been targeted by Doe, “tapped into
popular anger at Doe’s repression and ethnic discrimination”
48
and began to slaughter Krahns. The rebels splintered into
49
various factions. One group captured Doe, and a Palestinian
50
journalist filmed them torturing Doe to death. After Doe’s
51
death, rebel groups continued to vie for power. Despite
repeated peace talks and the presence of a regional African
52
peacekeeping force, the nation descended into violence. At
least seven major Liberian factions fought a civil war, which
spread through at least eighty percent of the nation’s
53
territory.
In 1995, the most powerful Liberian warlords signed a
54
treaty and agreed to form a transitional government. The
transitional government arranged for elections, and in 1997
55
Charles Taylor was elected president. As President Taylor
consolidated power and violently silenced dissent, Liberia
56
crumbled. In 2000, Liberian exiles in Guinea attacked Liberia
45. O’Connell, supra note 29, at 211 (“Doe gave political meaning to ethnic
differences within the indigenous population for the first time, creating ethnic
rivalries that would contribute to the later war.”). Even though Krahns
constituted less than five percent of the population, under Doe they held onethird of government posts and commanded every infantry battalion in the
army. PHAM, supra note 4, at 83.
46. O’Connell, supra note 29, at 212. Taylor was a former official in Doe’s
government who had fled to the United States after being accused of stealing
public funds. PHAM, supra note 4, at 94–95. He spent fifteen months in a U.S.
prison but escaped before he could be extradited to Liberia. Id. at 95. He
eventually returned to Africa, built a base of support, and launched his
invasion. Id. at 95–98.
47. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 9.
48. O’Connell, supra note 29, at 212.
49. Id.
50. PHAM, supra note 4, at 104–08.
51. See id. at 109–16 (explaining continued conflicts among Liberian
armed factions such as the NPFL, AFL, and ULIMO).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 116.
54. See id. at 124–27 (explaining the process of the Abuja agreement and
the faction leaders who participated in the agreement).
55. Id. at 131–34.
56. See id. at 177–80 (explaining how the Taylor government turned
Liberia’s military into a private army, tortured and killed political opponents
and critics, and silenced independent media outlets, and suggesting that, at
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in an attempt to overthrow Taylor, and the second phase of the
57
civil war began.
The fighting continued until Taylor,
58
surrounded by his enemies, fled the country in 2003.
In August of 2003, the major parties to the conflict signed a
59
peace agreement. Two months later, the United Nations
established a peacekeeping force: the United Nations Mission
60
in Liberia (UNMIL). National elections were held two years
61
later, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected president.
President Sirleaf faced the challenge of rebuilding a formal
justice system, which had been decimated by fourteen years of
62
war, and strengthening the anemic rule of law in rural areas.
The rebuilding of the formal justice system was a continuation
of Liberia’s longstanding desire to unite the nation under a
Western formal justice system; it was not a direct response to
the abuses committed during the civil war, which were
63
addressed by Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The vast majority of Liberians had little access to justice
64
during Doe’s rule and the subsequent civil war. This lack of
65
access, however, existed before Doe. Historically, Liberia
failed to provide access to formal justice to most Liberians;
therefore, the majority of Liberians have sought justice through
66
traditional mechanisms.
Liberians continued to seek
traditional justice despite the government’s efforts to regulate
67
and eliminate tribal justice practices. This has resulted in the
entrenched dual justice system that still exists today.

the same time, Liberia’s economy shrank in real terms and crime was
rampant).
57. O’Connell, supra note 29, at 216–17.
58. Id. at 217–18.
59. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 11.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44 (“The justice system that
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf inherited when she came to office in 2006 was
in tatters. Particularly in rural areas, police and magistrates were largely
unpaid and unregulated, and were often operating in their own interests.”).
63. See Pajibo, supra note 6, at 12–13 (discussing the formation and
purposes of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission). This and other
transitional justice issues are outside the scope of this paper.
64. Id. at 16.
65. See id. (explaining Liberians’ lack of access to justice and how military
dictatorship exacerbated it).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 16–24.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE DUAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Liberia has two systems of justice that operate
68
simultaneously: the formal system and the customary system.
The formal system is a Western-style adversarial justice
system that prioritizes individual rights and punitive
69
sanctions.
Nevertheless, it is often inaccessible, time
consuming, expensive, backlogged, and too combative for most
70
Liberians. The customary system uses traditional methods
71
and prioritizes restorative justice and social reconciliation.
72
While the majority of Liberians prefer the customary system,
it raises concerns among legal scholars about separation of
73
powers, due process, human rights, and gender equality.
A. THE FORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The formal justice system consists of state-sanctioned
74
courts, prosecutors, and other legal actors. Its authority stems
75
from the Liberian Constitution, statutes, and common law,
76
and it is based on the U.S. justice system.
The formal system has its strengths. There are clear
77
crimes and punishments, as well as procedures to protect due
68. Luccaro, supra note 12. Dividing the justice system into two pieces,
formal and customary, is an oversimplification. The reality is complex.
Certain chiefs and customary actors are sponsored by the state. Other
customary actors are informal leaders whose power comes through community
recognition. Liberians can also seek justice through elected representatives,
government officials, NGOs, former military commanders, and persons of
influence. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 76. However, understanding this
reality, the entire justice system can generally be divided into formal (based
on the constitution, operated by the government, and consistent with the
Americo-Liberian approach) and customary (based on traditional sources of
authority and practices, and consistent with the indigenous Liberian
approach) elements. That approach will be used in this paper.
69. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3–4.
70. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.D.
71. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3–4.
72. Id.
73. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.C.1.
74. Luccaro, supra note 12.
75. Rawls, supra note 7, at 109, n.2.
76. Dube, supra note 5, at 577 (explaining how the source of Liberia’s
codified law was American common law); Rawls, supra note 7, at 110, n.30
(explaining how Liberia’s 1986 Constitution, the current constitution, is
loosely patterned on the U.S. Constitution).
77. See, e.g., An Act to Amend the New Penal Code Chapter 14 Sections
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78

process. Its protections for human rights, children’s rights,
and gender equality are consistent with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of the Rights
79
of the Child. At times, the consequences meted out by the
formal system can be more effective than traditional
approaches. For example, in “The Case of the Unreturned
Goat,” Professor Peter Sevareid describes a case where the
formal system was able to stop a plaintiff’s overly litigious
80
behavior. The formal court used its coercive power, including
the threat of confinement, to stop the plaintiff and force him to
81
pay his court fees. In this case, a formal court better served
82
the defendant than a traditional justice practice.
However, the formal system also has pronounced
weaknesses. The system has a “bewildering array of fees,” lacks
transparency and impartiality, and is ineffective at enforcing
83
judgments.
It is “plagued by rampant corruption and
inaccessibility” and is chronically slow: ninety-six percent of
84
detainees in the formal system are in pretrial confinement,
85
which can last years. A 2009 study by the United States
14.70 and 14.71 to Provide for Gang Rape, LIBERIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs
/ELECTRONIC/85440/95667/F367499794/LBR85440.pdf (demonstrating the
specificity with which a crime is defined under the Liberian Penal Code).
78. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF LIBERIA Oct. 19, 1983, ch. III, art. 20a (“No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, security of the person, property,
privilege or any other right except as the outcome of a hearing judgment
consistent with the provisions laid down in this Constitution and in
accordance with due process of law.”).
79. See, e.g., International Development Law Organization, Women’s
NGO Secretariat of Liberia, Strengthening the Legal Protection Framework for
Girls in India, Bangladesh, Kenya and Liberia -- Liberia Country Report 23-45
(2010) (explaining how formal Liberian law has taken progressive steps
towards protecting women’s property rights and against child labor, slavery,
human trafficking, and child sexual exploitation). These protections are
consistent with international human rights standards. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, ¶¶ 2, 4, 17, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/;
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV) A, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/1386(XIV)
(Dec.
10,
1959),
http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus
/humanrights/resources/child.asp.
80. Peter Sevareid, The Case of the Unreturned Goat: Dispute Resolution
by a Mano Court in Liberia, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 61, 75 (1993).
81. Id. at 72–75.
82. Id. at 75.
83. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3, 46.
84. Luccaro, supra note 12.
85. While in Liberia, this author attended formal court hearings in three
rape cases and observed firsthand the slow speed of the formal system.
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Institute for Peace (USIP) and George Washington University
(GWU) found that “the formal system is seen almost
universally by Liberians as falling abysmally short of their
86
expectations in [affordability, accessibility, and timeliness].”
Even the formal system’s basic structure is a weakness in
Liberia. Formal courts are adversarial with a clear winner and
loser, creating bitterness and ongoing hostility among
87
Liberians. The defendant’s right to appear before a Circuit
Court judge often allows a defendant to escape liability unless
88
the plaintiff is wealthy. Additionally, the concept of “evidencebased due process” is foreign to rural leaders, who often rely on
traditional methods such as trial by ordeal to determine guilt
89
or innocence.
B. THE CUSTOMARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
The customary justice system is based on the norms and
90
values of traditional Liberian culture.
It “often operates
91
without state sanctioned authority.” However, the state

Defendant One had been in pretrial confinement for three years. The
government was unable to produce sufficient evidence to indict him and the
court released him on bail. Defendant Two had been in pretrial confinement
for two years. The government was unable to produce sufficient evidence to
indict him; the court dismissed the charges and released him. Defendant
Three had been in pretrial confinement for eleven months. As part of a plea
agreement, he pled guilty to a four count indictment and was sentenced to an
additional seven months of confinement. Observations of Circuit Court, in
Monrovia Liberia (June 28, 2012).
86. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
87. Sevareid, supra note 80, at 75 (discussing how “[i]t is unlikely that
good feelings between the parties will easily be renewed” after formal
litigation.). This is problematic in Liberia where harmonious community
relations are often more important than the vindication of individual rights.
88. Magistrate Court is often the court of first instance for minor cases.
However, defendants have the absolute right to have their case heard before a
Circuit Court judge, even in minor cases. Some defendants strategically
exercise this right and force plaintiffs to continue their suit in Circuit Court
where the court and lawyers’ fees are higher. Many plaintiffs cannot afford the
higher fees and are unable to continue with their suit. Interview with James
Cooper, Magistrate Judge of West Point, in Monrovia, Liberia (July 9, 2012).
89. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6 at 45. Trial by ordeal is a method of
justice that uses a physical process, often a dangerous act, to determine guilt
or innocence. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 17. For a further discussion of trial by
ordeal, see the section titled “The Customary Justice System” below.
90. Luccaro, supra note 12.
91. Id.
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recognizes and occasionally sponsors certain elements. While
specifics vary throughout the country, there are some common
practices including the kola nut, palava hut, and trial by
93
ordeal.
94
The kola nut is a justice method focused on forgiveness.
To resolve a dispute, the guilty party provides kola nuts to the
95
wronged party as atonement.
Cash, animals, and other
96
commodities may be used in place of kola nuts.
The exact
97
payment is determined by local elders.
The palava hut process is a justice method rooted in
98
mediation and dialogue. The individual parties to a dispute,
often with and sometimes represented by their families, meet
99
under the supervision of community elders. Depending upon
the accusation and the result of the mediation, the elders may
require restitution, payment of medical expenses, or even
100
banishment from the community.
There is often a period of
92. See UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA — LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
SYSTEM SUPPORT DIVISION, CASE PROGRESSION: ASSESSMENT / CAPACITY
DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL GOVERNORS’ COURT 9-19 (2011) [hereinafter UNMIL
CASE PROGRESSION] (discussing the role and functioning of the Tribal
Governors Court). Liberian law recognizes Tribal Governors as
representatives who may investigate tribal matters and resolve disputes. Id.
at 9. Of the Tribal Governors interviewed by UNMIL, 62% reported being on
the government’s payroll. Id. at 13. Additionally, the Liberian Constitution
creates a place for customary law and values. See CONSTITUTION OF LIBERIA
Oct. 19, 1983, ch. VII, art. 65 (“The courts shall apply both statutory and
customary laws in accordance with the standards enacted by the
Legislature.”); ch. II, art. 5 (“The Republic shall . . . preserve, protect and
promote positive Liberian culture, ensuring that traditional values which are
compatible with public policy and national progress are adopted and developed
as an integral part of the growing needs of the Liberian society.”) Notably, the
Constitution makes those laws and values subservient to legislation, public
policy, and national progress.
93. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16–23. Pajibo points out that forcible
displacement and government involvement may have undermined the
legitimacy and appeal of these processes. Nevertheless, these customary
processes are still used.
94. Id. at 16.
95. Id. at 16–17. Kola nuts are chestnut-size nuts that are grown in the
forests of West Africa. They have been a commodity for centuries, and are a
sign of hospitality and affluence for the wealthy. Paul E. Lovejoy, Kola in the
History of West Africa, 20 CAHIERS D'ÉTUDES AFRICAINES 97, 97 (1980).
96. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16–17.
97. See id. at 17.
98. While the palava hut process is used throughout Liberia, the specifics
vary between linguistic and ethnic groups. Id. at 18–22.
99. Id.
100. Id.

Compton Article

2014]

2/27/2014 6:11 PM

LESSONS OF RULE OF LAW IN LIBERIA

61

grieving, a shared meal, a public apology, and an
101
acknowledgement of forgiveness.
The palava hut process is
used to settle conflicts ranging from land disputes to
102
murders.
Trial by ordeal is a method of justice that uses a physical
process, often a dangerous act, to determine guilt or
103
innocence.
A community may force the accused to drink a
poisonous mixture, touch red-hot metal, or simply wear straw
104
tied around his neck.
The result of the ordeal (whether the
accused regurgitates the drink, gets burned by the metal, or the
straw spontaneously tightens around the accused’s neck)
105
indicates guilt or innocence.
Trial by ordeal can also be used
as a pledge to tell the truth. Kafu is a trial by ordeal process
where the parties to a dispute share a common meal or drink of
106
water.
It is believed that if a person later lies during the
107
proceeding, the food or water will sicken him. Liberians often
refer to trial by ordeal as “sassywood” after the tree they have
108
historically used for poison.
The customary system has noticeable strengths. It provides
“an accessible, affordable and efficient means of resolving
109
disputes”
rooted in restorative justice and social
110
reconciliation.
Customary processes are accessible to most
111
Liberians and their judgments are respected.
Settlements in
the customary system are more likely to produce “harmony”
112
and lasting peace between parties.
Customary methods are
generally cheaper; even though processes like the kola nut
require the party at fault to make a payment, there are no
113
attorney’s fees.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. at 17. See also ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 60 (describing a
variety of trial by ordeal techniques).
105. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 17.
106. Rawls, supra note 7, at 105.
107. Id.
108. Id.; P.T. Leeson & C.J. Coyne, Sassywood, 40 J. COMP. ECON. 608, 612
(2012).
109. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.B.2.
110. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4.
111. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 23-24 (identifying these as strengths of the
palava hut process). Even sassywood, which is illegal, is widespread. Id.at 17–
18.
112. Sevareid, supra note 80, at 75.
113. Pajibo, supra note 6, at 16–17.
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However, the customary system also has clear
114
weaknesses.
Customary courts have difficulty resolving
115
egregious cases. They are often ineffective or unfair when the
parties are from different communities, ethnic groups, or
116
religions.
Justice for the victim is important but is not the
primary concern, and social reconciliation often takes precedent
117
over individual compensation.
This can lead to troubling
results. UNMIL’s 2011 report on the Tribal Governors’ Courts
was sparked by a report of a Tribal Governor fining a man $48
118
USD for “deflowering” a woman.
In the formal system the
man could have been charged with rape and sentenced to ten
119
years in prison.
Some customary processes are illegal,
120
limiting appellate and state enforcement options.
Further,
trial by ordeal raises significant concerns about self121
incrimination, legal representation, and due process.
The customary system also raises concerns about gender
equality. Many tribes have customary laws that make
122
distinctions between men and women. These laws often treat
adult women as minors, and do not allow women to inherit
123
property from their fathers or their husbands.
These
customary practices deviate from the formal system’s

114. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4.
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 4.
118. UNMIL CASE PROGRESSION, supra note 92, at 7. In this case, both
parties agreed to have the case heard in the customary system by the Tribal
Governor.
119. Id. In Liberia, the maximum sentence for second degree rape is ten
years. The maximum sentence for first degree rape is life imprisonment. First
degree rape requires a minor victim, gang rape, serious or lasting injuries, or
the use of a deadly weapon. An Act to Amend the New Penal Code Chapter 14
Sections 14.70 and 14.71 and to Provide for Gang Rape (Dec. 29, 2005),
Paragraph 4, available at http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/uploads/Liberia%20%20Rape%20Amendment%20Act.pdf. The facts surrounding the allegation in
the UNMIL report are brief, but do not appear to support a first degree
charge.
120. See e.g. Rawls, supra note 7, at 104–105 (tracing the legality of trial by
ordeal and noting that the Liberian Supreme Court reiterated in 2005 that all
forms of trial by ordeal are unconstitutional).
121. Id. at 104 (quoting the Liberian Justice Minister’s explanation of the
judiciary’s position on trial by ordeal).
122. Susan H. Williams, Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law:
Constitutionalizing Internal Cultural Disruption, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL.
STUD. 65, 81 (2011).
123. Id.
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124

constitutional and statutory rights to equality.
Finally, the customary system’s structure raises concerns
about the separation of powers. Tribal chiefs are overseen by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is part of the executive
125
branch.
Therefore, chiefs who adjudicate cases are arguably
126
executive officers taking on a judicial role.
This is especially
problematic when the tribal chiefs’ decisions are not subject to
127
judicial review.
Unfortunately, the Liberian Constitution,
legislation, and Supreme Court decisions provide inconsistent
128
guidance on this issue.
C. LIBERIANS’ VIEWS OF THE TWO JUSTICE SYSTEMS
Liberia’s elite legal practitioners prefer the formal
129
system.
These are most often Americo-Liberians; however,
the group also includes indigenous Liberians who were
130
educated in the United States. Generally speaking, Liberians
who have the ability to shape legal policy have a strong sense of
131
respect for the formal system and courts.
They believe that
the formal system has the power to change the beliefs and
behaviors of Liberians, and that it will inevitably surpass the
132
customary system.
As a practical matter, many Liberians
choose the formal system when they believe their wealth,
connections, or status will give them an advantage over their
133
opponent.
However, even if the formal system worked smoothly for all
classes of Liberians, most say they would still be unsatisfied
134
with it.
Most Liberians value reconciliation, believing that
135
bad behavior stems from damaged social relationships.
To
them, adjudication through the formal justice system, an
adversarial system that focuses on winners and losers, will only
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.C.1.
Rawls, supra note 7, at 96–97.
See U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.C.1.
Id.
Rawls, supra note 7, at 100–02.
See id. at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.D.3.
ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
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136

further damage these relationships.
This emphasis on
repairing relationships is not always a mere preference; it is
often a matter of necessity in rural agrarian communities
137
where neighbors are economically dependent on one another.
While the formal system is focused on individual rights, many
138
Liberians view the term “human rights” negatively.
They
connect the term with the rights of children and defendants,
139
and perceive those rights as “undermining the social order.”
Many view formal courts as “inherently more coercive and
140
authoritarian” and much more susceptible to corruption than
141
traditional methods.
They see the formal system as merely a
142
way for the wealthy and powerful to promote their interests.
Even traditional leaders who see value in the formal system
143
believe the customary system is their only practical choice.
Because of these opinions, most Liberians choose not to
144
have their cases heard in the formal justice system.
In fact,
as few as three percent of civil cases and two percent of
145
criminal cases are heard in a formal court.
Liberians
generally believe that expanding the jurisdiction of tribal chiefs
would reduce crime, even if the tribal chiefs were prohibited
146
from using trial by ordeal.
Liberians’ confidence in the tribal
chiefs stems from the belief that chiefs would look for the “root
136. Id. at 4.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. (“Children’s rights are understood as encouraging children to sue
their parents and preventing them from working, which to rural Liberians is
an affront to social values and has serious economic implications. To
Liberians, whose conception of justice is about truth and reconciliation, rather
than an adversarial process, defendants’ rights are seen as giving an unfair
advantage to perpetrators at the expense of the victims.”).
140. Sevareid, supra note 80, at 74–75.
141. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.D.3.
142. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
143. See Luccaro, supra note 12 (explaining that traditional leaders are
open to change and appreciate the many advantages of a formal justice
system. However, they believe that policymakers do not listen to them and do
not appreciate their position. According to the traditional leaders, traditional
methods of justice, including trial by ordeal, are “the product of a rational
effort to make the most of the economic and social positions they inhabit.”).
144. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4.
145. Id. at 4, app. (discussing a study conducted in 2008 and 2009 by the
Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University). The study
concluded that 38 percent of civil cases and 45 percent of criminal cases were
heard in informal forums; the remaining cases were heard in no forum at all.
Id. at 4.
146. Id. at 87.
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causes” of problems, bring social pressure to enforce decisions,
147
and focus on reconciliation and reducing social conflict.
However, many Liberians believe that trial by ordeal should be
allowed in some form, and see its ban as an attack on their
148
culture and the reason for increased lawlessness.
D. UNDERSCORING THE DIFFERENCES BY EXAMINING RAPE
The differences between the two justice systems, as well as
Liberians’ differing perceptions of each, may be underscored by
149
examining rape. Liberians view rape as a serious issue.
However, the two systems of justice address rape in
dramatically different ways. The formal system identifies rape
150
as a crime and focuses on punishing the rapist. However, the
customary system often views rape as a problem between
151
families, not simply individuals.
The families may “talk
through” the rape and resolve the matter with payment,
marriage, or some other settlement designed to make the
152
victim’s family whole.
Currently, Liberian law gives the formal system exclusive
153
jurisdiction over rape cases, and most Liberians agree that
certain forms of rape, such as violent rape or the rape of a child,
154
are best addressed in a punitive fashion by formal courts.
However, Liberians prefer customary remedies for “less
egregious” forms of rape and continue to turn to tribal chiefs to
155
adjudicate rape cases. This broad preference appears to be
147. Id.
148. Id. at 5 (“The vast majority of Liberians we interviewed believe
strongly that at least some forms of trial by ordeal . . . should be allowed, and
raised very serious concerns that the ban on its use is causing significant
societal problems -- most particularly the inability to control crime and a rise
in witchcraft.”).
149. Id. at 66 (explaining that “women and men both identify rape as a
significant local problem.”).
150. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44. Such rape laws are relatively
new in Liberia. See Sara K. Cummings, Comment, Liberia’s “New War”: PostConflict Strategies for Confronting Rape and Sexual Violence, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
223, 236 (2011) (explaining that rape, other than gang rape, was not
criminalized in Liberia until 2005).
151. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44.
152. Id.
153. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 66.
154. Id. at 6, 46. Additionally, repeat offenses may be seen as “beyond
social repair” and deserving of referral to the formal system. Id. at 30.
155. See id. at 6, 70.
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shared by Liberian women as well. The 2009 USIP and GWU
study found “no evidence that when chiefs do intervene to
resolve [rape] cases they [do] so in ways . . . that are
156
unsatisfying to women.”
That finding “stands in rather
marked contrast to the very vociferous and explicit statements
of dissatisfaction with the outcomes for rape cases produced by
157
the formal system.” While acknowledging the need for further
research into whether customary solutions to rape are effective
for Liberian women, the study’s authors observe:
While the [formal] rape law may reflect the way
policymakers believe Liberian women should think
about rape, its consequences, and its remedy, our data
at the very least casts some doubt on assumptions
that it actually strikes a balance that local Liberian
women believe to be the right one for realizing a sense
158
of justice for rape victims.
One potential reason for Liberians’ preference for
customary resolutions to rape cases is the dysfunctional state of
the formal justice system. Both men and women believe that
the formal system does not adequately address rape cases,
formal rape laws are not effective deterrents, and that rapists
159
“generally get off with impunity.” There is also a perception
that formal justice system officials commit sex crimes
160
themselves. Additionally, the formal system’s fees are often
prohibitively high. Victim “fees” include paying for police
transportation costs, the accused’s prison food, a variety of
police and court administrative expenses, and even the paper
161
used for depositions. Even violent rapes which result in death
do not progress through the formal courts unless someone
162
continues to pay the “fees.”
This combination of dysfunction and corruption is
dramatically illustrated in the USIP and GWU’s report of the
156. Id. at 88.
157. Id.
158. Certain social realities may influence these views, including the
survival-based need for interactions with the perpetrator’s family and the
community, the likelihood of successful prosecution in a formal court, and the
costs of using the formal court system. Id. at 88–89.
159. Id. at 66–67.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 40.
162. Id.

2/27/2014 6:11 PM

Compton Article

2014]

LESSONS OF RULE OF LAW IN LIBERIA

67

case of an eighty-three year old woman named Lofa:
A man raped an eighty-three-year-old woman. The
woman was taken to the hospital where the rape was
confirmed, and the suspect was arrested and jailed.
The victim’s daughter went to the magistrate court to
pursue the case, but she was told that she had to pay
five hundred Liberian dollars. After she did, she was
told to get a second medical report. The case was then
referred to the circuit court. After traveling a second
time to the circuit court in Voinjama, they were told
that it was the end of the term and they would need to
come back the next term. The next term, there was no
transportation available and it was the rainy season.
The victim was put in a wheelbarrow for transport,
but as her health was failing, her daughter decided to
bring her mother home and to go to the court herself.
Once there she was told that unless her mother was
present the court would not hear the case. The next
day she was told by the court that the suspect had
broken out of jail. In the meantime, while she was at
163
the court, her mother died.
Another potential reason Liberians prefer customary
resolutions to rape is the adversarial nature of the formal
justice system. Even in rape cases, Liberians often view social
164
reconciliation as more important than punishment per se.
They fault the formal system for narrowly focusing on the
165
criminal act without considering broader social factors. In
rural Liberian life, reconciliation is more than a mere
preference. Continuing interaction with the perpetrator’s
family and the broader community can be a matter of
166
survival. For rural Liberian women, “a greater emphasis on
social reconciliation and restoration may prove to be quite
167
rational calculations.”
III. POST-WAR RULE OF LAW REFORMS

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 89.
Id.
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Since the civil war, a large amount of work and
international support has gone into strengthening the formal
168
justice system. However, the average citizen has benefited
169
little from these reforms, especially outside of Monrovia.
Policymakers in Liberia and nations around the world often
assume that a uniform justice system will strengthen the rule
170
of law and avoid the past injustice. Some seek to abolish the
171
customary system and have only a formal system. Ironically,
reforms which have limited the customary courts’ jurisdiction
172
may have inadvertently decreased justice on the local level.
Furthermore, most rural Liberians reject the idea that the laws
of Monrovia or the international community should replace or
override their customary practices, and see such reform efforts
173
as a power grab by the Monrovian elite.
Interestingly, they
reject these reforms without rejecting the ultimate authority of
the national government or the need for the formal system in
174
their community.
Recently, Liberian policy makers changed their approach
and began seeking ways to ease the tension between the two
justice systems. In 2008, reform-minded lawyers and scholars
175
created the Liberian Legal Working Group (LWG). The LWG
met multiple times during 2009 to discuss justice reform and
176
Liberia’s dual justice system.
In addition to internal
168. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 44 (describing the work as
including “training judges, magistrates, prosecutors and public defenders;
renovating court buildings; and regularising salaries.”).
169. Id.
170. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 71.
171. Id.
172. When the formal system is not a credible alternative, many Liberians
believe that restrictions on the customary system lead to injustice. Id. at 5.
(“Our data suggests that to the extent that local Liberians view the formal
system as less comprehensible and more susceptible to corrupt influence than
customary alternatives, the limitation of the customary courts’ jurisdiction is
seen as actually diminishing the degree of transparency, accountability, and
integrity of local justice.”) Id. at 85.
173. Id. at 71–72.
174. As discussed above, most Liberians believe that the formal system is
the appropriate forum to address certain crimes, such as the rape of a child.
However, they reject the idea that the formal system, as a rule, should replace
or override their customary practices. Id.
175. The LWG was convened by UNMIL, USIP, and the Carter Center, at
the request of individuals from various organizations including the Ministries
of Justice and Internal Affairs, the judiciary, the Liberian bar, a Liberian law
school, and a variety of nongovernmental organizations. See Luccaro, supra
note 12.
176. See id.
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discussion, the group met with the Traditional Leadership
Council, which represents and promotes the interests of
177
traditional leaders. The LWG formally adopted findings on
178
December 10, 2009. It found that the dual justice system
179
remained a reality for Liberians years after the civil war. The
customary system continued largely the same as before the war
180
and was common in rural communities. Additionally, the
strengths and weaknesses of the two justices systems remained
181
the same.
However, the LWG went beyond restating the tensions in
the dual justice system: it established guiding principles for
182
reform. The group stated that future reforms should focus on
improving the quality of justice for all Liberians rather than
183
merely the structure of the legal system. Policies should be
realistic, not just in terms of available resources but also in
184
light of the social realities of how Liberians view justice.
Policy makers should consider the impact of justice reforms on
broader nation-building goals and encourage more local
185
participation. The group proposed reevaluating jurisdiction
laws, potentially allowing traditional courts to resolve more
186
civil and criminal cases. They also concluded that justice
should be broader than penal sanctions and should incorporate
187
restorative remedies. Finally, the LWG declared that the
government should work to understand the purposes and local
perceptions of “onerous practices,” such as trial by ordeal,
188
before imposing a ban.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. U.S. INST. FOR PEACE, supra note 13, at I.A.1.
180. Id. at I.B.1.
181. The LWG found the customary justice system to be focused on the
concerns of Liberians, accessible, affordable, effective, based on social
reconciliation, and preferred. See id. at I.B. However, the customary justice
system raised concerns about separation of powers, due process, human rights,
and gender equality. Id. at I.C.1. The formal justice system lacked resources
and was inaccessible, time consuming, expensive, and severely backlogged.
See id. at I.D. Liberians viewed the formal system as susceptible to corruption,
favoring the elite, and too adversarial. Id. at I.D.3, I.D.5.
182. See id. at II.
183. Id. at II.A.
184. Id. at II.B.
185. Id. at II.D.
186. Id. at III.A.1.
187. Id. at III.A.2.
188. Id. at III.A.3.
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The LWG findings were given to the Justice Minister and
four regional meetings were convened to discuss further
189
reform.
Representatives of all fifteen counties in Liberia
were present, including members of the government, judiciary,
190
and traditional leaders.
Similar issues were identified at all
four meetings, including the need to give traditional leaders an
191
official role in the formal justice system. These meetings laid
the groundwork for the National Conference held in April of
2010—”Enhancing Access to Justice: A Review of Our
192
Customary and Statutory Systems.”
The purpose of the
National Conference was to create recommendations on how
the two justice systems could work together and both be
193
strengthened.
Participants, including government officials,
civil society representatives, and traditional leaders, discussed
a variety of topics including trial by ordeal and women’s
194
rights.
Participants created a long list of recommendations,
including giving traditional chiefs an official role in the formal
justice system as advisors to prosecutors on customary
resolutions for criminal cases, allowing alternative forms of
oath-taking that were consistent with traditional beliefs and
constitutional rights, and writing down customary law so it can
195
be evaluated and even applied by formal courts.
A PostConference Review Committee summarized the conference’s
recommendations for use by the Law Reform Commission
196
(LRC).
As of 2012, discussions on linking the formal and
customary justice systems were on-going in the LRC and the
197
Committee on the Role of Non-Lawyers (CRNL).
189. Rawls, supra note 7, at 92–93.
190. Id. at 93.
191. Id. at 94.
192. See id. at 97. The conference was co-hosted by the Ministry of Justice,
Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Supreme Court. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 97–98.
195. Rawls, supra note 7, at 98–100.
196. Id. at 97–99. The LRC is responsible for “streamlining the law reform
and review process in Liberia, ensuring that the process is participatory and
responsive to the needs of Liberia.” Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory
Service, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, The Liberia
Law Reform Commission, Five Year Strategic Plan and Its Impact, JUST. REV.,
June 2012, at 22, 22.
197. Flomoku & Reeves, supra note 6, at 46. The CRNL, with the
assistance of international and non-governmental organizations, is examining
the laws and regulations that govern rural areas with an eye towards eventual
constitutional reform. Liberia: Policy Dialogue and Reform, THE CARTER
CENTER, http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/liberia-policy-

Compton Article

2014]

2/27/2014 6:11 PM

LESSONS OF RULE OF LAW IN LIBERIA

71

The work of the LWG, regional meetings, National
Conference, LRC, and CRNL is more than bureaucratic
window-dressing; the discussions of these groups demonstrate
a fundamental change in mindset. As she opened the National
Conference, Liberia’s Justice Minister stated:
[L]aws are rooted in the values and beliefs of a people
and therefore the enactment of any legislation must
take into account socio-cultural realities; we cannot
continue to ignore the desire of our people to have
customs and traditions recognized by the formal
justice system, but we must do so being mindful that
it is imperative to apply rules and principles that are
198
fair and just, and show respect for human dignity.
Several traditional leaders participating at the National
Conference remarked that they felt as though they were being
199
listened to for the first time.
Notably, participants did not
“simply present a list of grievances, but engaged in
200
brainstorming possible concrete policy solutions.”
Trial by ordeal highlights the differences in this new
approach. Liberia’s formal justice system has opposed trial by
201
ordeal for almost a century. Traditional leaders, however,
continue to view trial by ordeal as the only effective tool for
combating witchcraft, which they perceive to be an underlying
202
source of the wrongdoing in their communities. While wellintentioned, the government’s ban on trial by ordeal actually
“deteriorated the state’s legitimacy in the minds of many

dialogue-reform.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). According to an associate
director of the Carter Center, a non-governmental organization working with
the CRNL, such reforms “help ensure that any new laws stand a better chance
of being both consistent with Liberia's reform agenda, existing laws—
including Liberia's international human rights obligations—and the realities
of community traditions and practices, as far as this is possible.” Id.
198. Rawls, supra note 7, at 96 (quoting Justice Minister C P Tah’s speech
delivered at the opening of the National Conference).
199. Id. at 97.
200. Id.
201. In 1916, the Supreme Court outlawed trial by ordeal that results in
death. In 1940, the Court declared all forms of trial by ordeal unconstitutional.
While, the Hinterland Regulations of 2001 permit non-dangerous trial by
ordeal, the Supreme Court again declared all trial by ordeal to be
unconstitutional in 2005. Id. at 104.
202. Luccaro, supra note 12.
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203

Liberians.”
Many concluded from the ban that the state
204
protected or even participated in witchcraft.
To combat this
perception,
the
National
Conference
recommended
205
distinguishing “good sassywood” from “bad sassywood.” Some
forms of trial by ordeal, such as Kafu, where the parties pledge
to tell the truth by sharing a common meal or a drink of water,
206
are physically harmless and resemble oaths.
Officially
recognizing these methods could increase the public’s faith in
207
the formal judicial system.
IV. ANALYSIS: FROM IMPOSITION TO CONSIDERATION
Liberia’s history and experience with rule of law reform
lead to two key conclusions. First, the imposition of a Western
justice system has been a source of conflict in Liberia and has
not strengthened the rule of law. Second, recent efforts to
consider the reasons and values behind the customary system,
rather than merely focusing on its elimination, have eased
tensions and shown great potential for strengthening the rule
of law in Liberia.
A. IMPOSING A WESTERN JUSTICE SYSTEM HAS BEEN A
SOURCE OF CONFLICT IN LIBERIA AND HAS NOT
STRENGTHENED THE RULE OF LAW
The history of Liberia’s justice system has been one of
imposition. The Americo-Liberian settlers initially created a
208
formal justice system only for themselves. As the indigenous
population became part of the nation, the ruling class did not
seek their perspective on justice. Rather, the government
regulated customary courts and practices in an attempt to
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. Rawls, supra note 7, at 105. The LWG also discussed this. See
Luccaro, supra note 12 (explaining that one member of the LWG noted that
“[w]hile there are certainly onerous methods of trial by ordeal that deserve
restriction, they are not necessarily representative of the entire spectrum of
traditional behaviors.”).
206. Rawls, supra note 7, at 105. National Conference participants
wondered if Kafu was any different than taking an oath in court. However,
Rawls emphasizes that such truth-telling rituals must be balanced with due
process. Id. at 105, 108.
207. Id. at 105.
208. See Dube, supra note 5, at 577.
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bring them in line with formal standards. Eventually, the
government banned customary courts and practices all
209
together. This imposition of the formal system reinforced the
differences between the Americo-Liberian ruling class and the
indigenous population and directly contributed to the growing
social unrest that eventually led Liberia to civil war.
After the civil war, the imposition continued. The Liberian
government, along with the United Nations, United States, and
other international partners, focused on strengthening the
formal justice system and eliminating customary practices that
they deemed onerous. While their focus on due process and
human rights was commendable, their actions created more
tension. Indigenous Liberians, having experienced 150 years of
imposition from Monrovia, viewed the elimination of customary
practices as another power grab by the central government and
its foreign allies.
Some may argue that tension is a price worth paying to
strengthen the rule of law; because if the formal system
strengthens rule of law in the long run, it is worth imposing
even if the transition is difficult. However, while the formal
system has strengths, its imposition has not strengthened the
210
rule of law in Liberia.
First, the formal system does not function effectively
enough to strengthen the rule of law. All members of society
are not held accountable to the law because the system is
corrupt. Courts are not transparent as to why litigants are
charged fees, and parties use their wealth and power to
211
influence judges.
Laws are not equally enforced because the
system lacks the resources to function in many parts of the
country. A system in which ninety-six percent of detainees are
212
in pretrial confinement is not consistent with international
human rights standards. Forcing Liberians to use such a
dysfunctional justice system does not strengthen the rule of
law.
Second, even if the formal system functioned efficiently, its
209. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
210. In addition to the two arguments below, it may be argued that the
conflict created by imposition itself undermined the rule of law. The violent
coups, public executions, and ethnic violence of the civil war are the antithesis
of the rule of law.
211. See Rawls, supra note 7, at 94 (discussing corruption as a key finding
in the four regional pre-conference meetings).
212. Luccaro, supra note 12.
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imposition would not strengthen the rule of law because many
Liberians would lose their only practical source of justice as
they understand the term. Most Liberians who seek justice use
213
the customary system.
It provides a reconciliation-based
approach that is consistent with their values and practically
meets their needs. The government’s bans on customary
practices and imposition of the formal system have not changed
this. Rather, bans and imposition have taken away the only
practical justice option for a majority of Liberians. Without a
customary system, these Liberians turn to underground
214
customary practices or give up on seeking justice altogether.
This is why trial by ordeal continues in the shadows despite the
government ban, why Liberians still seek customary
resolutions to rape despite laws giving formal courts exclusive
jurisdiction, and why over half of Liberian civil and criminal
215
cases are never heard in any kind of forum.
A policy of
imposition does not promote international human rights
standards, but rather incentivizes injustice. By acknowledging
these realities, Liberia’s new approach strives to avoid this
danger.
B. RECENT EFFORTS TO CONSIDER THE REASONS AND
VALUES BEHIND THE CUSTOMARY SYSTEM, RATHER
THAN MERELY REGULATING OR ELIMINATING IT, HAVE
EASED TENSIONS AND SHOWN GREAT POTENTIAL FOR
STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW IN LIBERIA
As demonstrated by the work of the LWG, National
Conference, LRC, and CRNL, Liberia has changed its approach
to rule of law reform. The government is listening to the
perspectives of traditional leaders and considering the socio216
cultural realities that have shaped the customary system.
This stands in clear contrast to the government’s pre-LWG
approach which merely considered the customary system’s
regulation or elimination. This new approach has not changed
213. ISSER ET AL., supra note 11, at 4, 97 (discussing a Centre for the Study
of African Economies at Oxford University study which found that three
percent of civil cases and two percent of criminal cases were heard in formal
courts, thirty-eight percent of civil cases and forty-five percent of criminal
cases were heard in informal forums, and the remaining cases were heard in
no forum at all). The study was conducted in 2008 and 2009. Id. app. at 97.
214. Id. at 4–6.
215. Id. at 4–6, 70.
216. See supra, notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
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Liberia’s desire for a Western formal system that meets
international standards; the nation is not condoning all
traditional practices or incorporating them into the formal
system. However, the new approach of integrating the opinions
of local leaders and some traditional customs has eased
tensions and has great potential for strengthening the rule of
217
law in Liberia.
First, Liberia’s new approach is easing tensions because it
breaks from the nation’s history of imposition. For indigenous
Liberians, rule of law reform has historically meant that they
are on the receiving end of decisions from the central
government. Liberia’s new approach breaks from this past by
giving indigenous Liberians a role in the reform process and
218
truly listening to what they are saying.
Now that the
indigenous Liberians participating in the reform process feel
listened to, they view Monrovia as a partner rather than an
opponent. Differences can now be acknowledged and openly
discussed, rather than feeding resentment and escalating into
ethnic conflict.
Second, Liberia’s new approach focuses on the underlying
values and needs of Liberians. The majority of Liberians have
long preferred the customary system because it is consistent
with their values of social reconciliation and truth telling. It
also practically meets the needs of rural agrarian communities.
When customary practices were banned, many Liberians felt as
if their values and way of life were under attack. However,
when Monrovia looked at the customary system it did not see
those values and needs. Rather, it saw a system devoid of due
process that used superstitious ideas to reach arbitrary results
219
in violation of basic human rights.
This difference in
perspective was a source of continual tension. Now, the
government is meeting with traditional leaders, listening to
their values, and considering the socio-cultural realities of
rural Liberia. The emphasis has shifted from whether a
particular custom, such as trial by ordeal, should be banned, to
how the value behind that custom (the need for a public,
unequivocal commitment to telling the truth) can be respected
in the formal system in way that is consistent with
220
international human rights standards. Further, rather than
217.
218.
219.
220.

See supra, notes 197–200 and accompanying text.
See Rawls, supra note 7, at 97.
See U.S. INST. FOR PEACE supra note 13, at I.C.1.
See Rawls, supra note 7, at 104–05 (discussing Liberia’s past efforts to
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merely criticizing the results of customary processes (a rapist
being fined 48 dollars), the government is considering how the
formal system can better function in the reality of tribal life
(the victim and perpetrator’s families must continue to farm
together to survive). This new approach eases tensions because
the government is now considering what is truly important to
most Liberians.
Finally, Liberia’s new approach has great potential for
strengthening the rule of law because it unites the entire
population behind a single effort to establish a functional and
modern justice system. As the government listens to their
perspective, indigenous Liberians are increasingly open to
221
cooperation.
Additionally, now that underlying values are
openly discussed, the government is better able to explain how
the formal system upholds those values. Further, the
cooperation of both sides will allow the government to address
the formal system’s structural weaknesses. As discussions
continue and reforms are enacted, indigenous Liberians will
become progressively more comfortable with and invested in
the formal system. Ultimately, this will facilitate Liberia’s
transition to a unified formal system that upholds its
population’s values in a way that is consistent with
international human rights standards. Such a system, which
all Liberians respect and to which all Liberians are
accountable, will significantly strengthen the rule of law.
Imposing a Western justice system has been a source of
conflict in Liberia and has not strengthened the rule of law.
However, recent efforts to consider the reasons and values
behind the customary system, rather than merely regulating or
eliminating it, have eased tensions and shown great potential
for strengthening the rule of law. Beyond these conclusions,
Liberia’s history and experience with rule of law reform provide
valuable lessons for future rule of law missions in other
nations.
V. LESSONS FROM LIBERIA FOR FUTURE RULE OF
LAW MISSIONS

ban trial by ordeal and recent discussions as to how some physically harmless
forms of trial by ordeal, such as Kafu, are similar to oaths and could have a
place in the formal justice system).
221. See id. at 97 (discussing how the National Conference led to the
parties “brainstorming possible concrete solutions.”).
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Liberia’s history and experience with rule of law reform
provide valuable lessons for reformers in other nations. While
each situation is different, Liberia’s journey illustrates the
importance of understanding a nation’s history, the potential
for rule of law imposition to be counterproductive, and the
value in avoiding the either/or approach. The United States
and its partners should consider these lessons when planning
future rule of law missions.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY
A population’s view of rule of law reform may be shaped by
centuries old conflicts. Populations that have endured
colonization may be suspicious of Western justice systems.
Further, nations with a history of civil conflict or coups may
view reformers as simply the latest strongman to take control.
These perceptions will impact the willingness of a population to
accept rule of law reforms. To overcome this, reformers need to
effectively demonstrate that “rule of law” is not a buzzword
used to justify a power grab; rather, it is a commitment to
holding everyone accountable to the same rules.
B. IMPOSITION CAN BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
Strengthening the rule of law takes time and concerted
effort. It is tempting for a reform-minded government to simply
ban old practices and mandate a modern system, or for
international partners to condition their support on immediate
reforms. While this may work in certain circumstances, it may
prove counterproductive in others. Populations with deeply
ingrained justice traditions may resist reform, especially if the
new system is dysfunctional, misunderstood, or ill-suited for
their needs. Mandating the new system will not lessen this
resistance. Rather, it may encourage people to ignore the law
and seek underground traditional practices, or give up on
seeking justice altogether. This does not strengthen the rule of
law. To overcome this, reformers should consider socio-cultural
realities as they design and implement reforms. This may mean
a longer reform process; however, successful reform may be
impossible without it.
C. AVOIDING THE EITHER/OR APPROACH

2/27/2014 6:11 PM

Compton Article

78

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 23:1

Often, reform minded governments and their international
partners approach the rule of law with an either/or mindset.
Either the nation will continue with outdated practices or it
will embrace modern standards. With an eye to due process and
human rights, the reformers understandably want to ban the
old and mandate the new. However, this approach results in
imposition which may be counterproductive to the reformers’
goals.
Rule of law reform does not have to take the either/or
approach. Certainly, some traditional practices are
incompatible with international standards. However, even
onerous practices may be rooted in values that are consistent
with due process and human rights. Reformers should seek to
understand traditional values, link those values to the modern
system’s values, and, when possible, structure the modern
system in a way that respects traditional beliefs. A population
will be more inclined to give up its traditional practices when
the new justice system supports its underlying values.
CONCLUSION
The United States, along with the United Nations and
other international partners, will almost certainly be involved
in future rule of law missions. What approach will they take?
How can they realistically encourage reform while maintaining
their commitment to the rule of law and human rights?
Liberia’s experience provides some helpful lessons. While there
are onerous customary practices that rightly deserve to be
eliminated, mandating their elimination and imposing a
modern system may lead to conflict and ultimately undermine
rule of law reform. Alternatively, seeking the values behind
customary practices is a good way to encourage a unified effort
towards a justice system which all respect and to which all are
accountable.

